Based on a qualitative study of Chinese-led construction projects in Mozambique, the article explores how Chinese engagement in the construction sector affects workplace regimes. The study addresses the following set of questions: What characterises the workplace regimes of Sino-Mozambican workplaces, and why do the workplace regimes give rise to resentment and tension amongst the Mozambican workers? Furthermore, how is labour agency constrained or enabled within these workplace regimes? The data reveals that the Chinese companies are granted great freedom to develop workplace regimes as they see fit, characterised by functional flexibility, low pay, and few benefits. Furthermore, the creation of a divided Sino-Mozambican workplace, with separate workplace regimes for the Chinese and the Mozambican workers, exacerbates resentment amongst Mozambican workers and prevents social relationships across nationalities from forming. The Mozambican workers employ multiple strategies to express their discontent, but labour agency is constrained by weak national institutional support, and lack of alternative employment opportunities in the local labour market.
Introduction
On January 4 th 2014, 230 Mozambican workers from the Chinese-led construction project
Estrada Circular (Maputo Ring Road) initiated a strike. According to local media, 1 the workers were protesting against a missing New Year bonus, dismissals without just cause, physical assaults, lack of written work contracts, and poor health and safety conditions. The
Mozambican workers, however, were more concerned with the initial trigger in their narrative of the strike:
It started when a black boss hit a driver and we saw that he was already becoming like the Chinese, having the same behaviour as the Chinese, and turning against his real brothers. Therefore, we decided to do the strike. 2 (Group interview, Mozambican workers, 16.01.14)
The distinction between these two descriptions reveals that the workers find their resentment originating in complex issues of segregation and distrust. Several interviews with the Mozambican workers illustrate how they categorise certain behaviour as Chinese and the implicit expectation amongst them to support each other -against the Chinese. There is a very vivid us vs them mentality in the Sino-Mozambican workplace, leading to unresolved tension between the two nationalities working side by side on construction projects in the capital area of Mozambique.
This article will use the analytical concepts of workplace regimes and labour agency to explore how Chinese engagement in the construction sector in Mozambique affects the workplaces. First, the article explores why the workplace regimes created give rise to resentment and tension, and second, examines how labour agency of the Mozambican workers is constrained or enabled within these workplace regimes. The study draws on the labour agency approach in labour geography, and seeks to understand the workplace and labour agency from the Mozambican workers' perspective.
There is a growing literature on Chinese business practices in Africa (e.g., Baah and Jauch 2009; Lee 2009; HRW 2011) . However much is still unknown about how local populations receive and negotiate Chinese company practices. The bulk of research on China in Africa has based its analyses on macro-data of trade, investments and aid flows, but few qualitative, fieldwork-based studies have been conducted (Braütigam 2008; Mohan and Power 2009 ).
Ample attention has been given to speculations about the Chinese agenda, strategies and motives for operating in Africa, as well as attempts to unpack links between the Chinese state and Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Alden and Davies 2006; Lee 2006; Meidan 2006; Kragelund 2009 ). Although several scholars have contributed to understanding working conditions in Sino-African workplaces (see, e.g., Giese and Thiel 2012; Lee 2009; Nielsen 2014 ), these studies have not analysed workplace regimes. The workplace regime approach provides a useful framework for examining the interplay between the various elements that create conditions in a specific workplace, and gives a basis for understanding resentment in the workplace.
African governments appear eager to develop relations with China, and many developing countries today seem to envy China's outstanding economic achievements. China has become Africa's largest trading partner, and two-way trade between China and Africa reached 166 billion USD in 2011, up from 2 billion USD in 1999 (Cottle 2014) . Moreover, China has obtained growing influence on the continent, with its most visible imprint being the many large-scale infrastructure projects and prestige projects in construction. China has become active in the construction industry in almost every African economy (CCS 2006) , making this industry a relevant point of departure when exploring Sino-African relations. During the late 1990s, the Chinese government saw the need to make the SOEs more self-reliant and globally competitive and urged them to invest and operate abroad. In 2001, the strategy was formalised as China's 'Going Out' or 'Going Global' strategy (HRW 2011 Mozambique has had one of the fastest growth rates of trade with China experienced by any single nation (Robinson 2012 Despite impressive growth rates with an average of 7 percent GDP growth annually over the last decades (Dibben 2010; IMF 2011) , the Mozambican economy is still characterised by a strong dependence on foreign capital. The country's development strategy has focused on attracting foreign investments that should yield economic growth, and eventually trickle (Magnusson, Knutsen, and Endresen 2010) . down to benefit poorer segments of the population (Afrodad 2008; Wethal 2015) . According to Nielsen (2014) , the Mozambican government has given China 'a seemingly unlimited economic room for manoeuvre' (68).
Apparently, the governing elite perceive Chinese activities as a potential advantage and diversity against traditional partners, after decades of relying on aid from the Western donor community (Alden, Chichava and Roque 2014) . However, while the government continue to welcome Chinese engagement, tension is emerging in various areas of Sino-Mozambican cooperation, especially amongst Mozambican workers in Chinese-led projects.
The strike mentioned above provides a starting point for discussing this tension. I will first discuss the two theoretical concepts on which the analysis is based, and which form the analytical framework: workplace regimes and labour agency. I will then elaborate on the methods for data collection and analysis. I explore the workplace regimes created in SinoMozambican workplaces and examine tension and resentment amongst the Mozambican workers. Furthermore, I discuss how agency of Mozambican labour is constrained or enabled by the workplace regime. The concluding section summarises the main findings.
The workplace in theory and practice
Every workplace is created through a web of policies and practices, and can be studied at different analytical and geographical levels. Moreover, the globalisation of production has led to a complex set-up that requires an understanding of the 'spatial politics of production' (Pun and Yu 2008 The literature tends to use factory regimes, labour regimes, and workplace regimes interchangeably (see Magnusson, Knutsen, and Endresen 2010; Dokka, Knutsen and Endresen 2015) . For example, while Burawoy (1985) use factory regimes as an analytical abstraction, Nichols et al. (2004) have operationalised the same concept in order to describe specific workplaces. The general approach of the operationalization of Nichols et al. (2004) invites analyses of workplaces beyond the factory, but their use of the concept factory regimes limits the analysis semantically. I find the term workplace regime preferable in this analysis because the objective is to study processes in concrete workplaces.
Analytically, a workplace regime entails two interlinked levels of politics: the organization of the workplace and the politics of production (Burawoy 1985; Peck 1996) . The organization of the workplace, or the first level, refers to the technical and social organisation of the labour process. Nichols et al. (2004) The links between labour control issues, material support issues, and contract issues are also central to how workers perceive their own working conditions such as the working environment and terms and conditions of employment.
The second level of politics that make up a workplace regime is the 'politics of production', or the political apparatus of production and the institutions that regulate and shape workplace practices (Burawoy 1985; Peck 1996) . Workplace regimes do not evolve in isolation, but rather develop under the influence of local, national, and global regulations and institutions (Magnusson, Knutsen, and Endresen 2010) . This second level of issues will thus be analysed by highlighting how the state, market, and collective organisation in Mozambique affect practices in the Sino-Mozambican workplace. The interplay between these two levels of politics is central in explaining the nature of workplace regimes.
Labour agency under contemporary globalisation Castree et al. (2004, 159) define agency as 'the capacity possessed by individuals and groups to act for their own benefit or for the well-being of others'. In this article, understanding agency means understanding how the Mozambican workers, both as a group and individually, 'play a role in seeking, and obtaining, incremental and sometimes highly significant changes in microspaces of work and living ' (Rogaly 2009, 11) .
During the 1990s, labour geographers introduced the notion of labour agency to the agenda as an alternative to the view of workers as passive victims of the workings of capitalism (Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge 2008; Carswell and de Neve 2013) . Such an approach focuses on how workers themselves may attempt to '…shape the landscape of capitalism to their own advantage' (Herod 2001, 4) . Of main importance is to make workers' experiences and actions central to the analyses of capitalism, hence, understanding the geography of work and capitalism from their perspective (Herod 2001 Labour geographers tend to approach agency along the lines of space, scale and place in order to grasp the complex conditions that affect the strength of workers' agency (Coe and JordhusLier 2011) . Space refers to how workers' position within the geographies of capitalism affects the impact of their actions. Scale refers to the level at which negotiations occur, for whom decisions are made, or across what territories solidarity is pursued. Scale places focus on the crucial role of regulatory institutions conditioning working life. Both space and scale contribute in shaping place. Features of place determine the mobility of workers, their ability to move between workplaces, affected by workers' attachments and responsibilities in place.
Space, scale and place are used to understand the potentials for and limitations to workers' agency in the Sino-Mozambican workplace.
Labour agency entails both workers' collective struggles and individual struggles. Individual struggles, however, have frequently been overlooked compared to collectively organised political strategies (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011) . In this article, agency will be analysed with reference to both collectively organised political strategies and by individual worker's responses to improve working conditions. I use the concepts of exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect in order to explore how workers' response strategies are linked to agency. The first three concepts can be traced back to Hirschman (1970) , in his attempt to understand responses to decline in firms, organisations, or states. His approach was later applied to workers' response to job dissatisfaction, and neglect was included as a fourth category (e.g., Farrell 1983; Rusbult et al. 1988; Farrell and Rusbult 1992) . Exit and voice are active response strategies. Exit refers to requesting a transfer, searching for a different job, or simply thinking about quitting. Voice describes constructive actions workers take to improve working conditions such as discussing problems with superiors or colleagues, suggesting solutions, seeking help from outside, or by whistle blowing. Loyalty and neglect are passive responses, when workers loyally wait and hope for an improvement while trusting the organization to do the right thing, or passively allowing working conditions to deteriorate due to reduced effort or interest.
Methods and data
The theoretical concepts outlined in the sections above form the analytical framework that has guided this analysis of Sino-Mozambican workplaces. I analyse labour agency by examining how the workers respond to the workplace regime. Workers' response strategies can be understood as a concretisation of labour agency within a particular workplace.
Workplace regimes may enable or constrain labour agency, and labour agency may affect how workplace regimes are organised. Consequences of workers' response strategies may alter the workplace regimes created, and add to workers' agency (i.e. when a strike leads to alterations in working conditions). The analysis is concerned with how workplace regimes influence agency and how agency influences workplace regimes. The broader institutional framework affects both workplace regimes and response strategies, through the state (laws, regulations, capacity), the market (competition, labour market) and collective bargaining (strength and capacity of trade unions).
The analysis of the Sino-Mozambican workplaces is based on data from fieldwork conducted in Maputo, Mozambique, from May to September, 2013. I examined three projects led by
Chinese companies in road works, water supply, and housing. Two of the Chinese companies were state-owned; the third was a joint venture between a Chinese state-owned company and a Mozambican directorate which together formed a private company. I have anonymised the Chinese companies in this article. Contrary to the popular depiction of the 'Chinese way' as bringing labour from China¸ Mozambicans made up more than ¾ of the workers in the workplaces in this study.
Together with a research assistant, I collected data through observation and 35 semistructured interviews. Observation took place on the construction sites and included observations of work routines, interaction, cooperation and communication between the Mozambican workers and their Chinese superiors. We also accessed documentation such as pay checks, contracts and time sheets. We conducted nine semi-structured interviews (group and individual) with Mozambican workers. Three supplementary interviews with workers were conducted in 2014. 5 Most of these interviews took place outside construction sites during lunch breaks, and were generally not arranged in advance. We conducted the remaining interviews with Chinese company administration and engineers (eight interviews),
Mozambican ministries and governmental bodies linked to the projects (seven interviews), inspection companies (three interviews), and trade unions, business associations, and related organisations (five interviews). These interviews were arranged in advance, and took place in formal settings. The duration of the interviews varied from 30 minutes to 1,5 hours, depending on the informants' schedule. I audiotaped and later transcribed most of the interviews, and documented the remaining with detailed interview notes.
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All interview transcripts, interview notes, and observational notes were organised and coded in the NVivo software for qualitative analysis. The coding captured the operationalisation of Nichols et al (2004) for identifying workplace regimes; labour control issues, material issues and contract issues, and codes such as negotiation, communication, resistance and conflict identified agency. In the first round of coding, I found broader themes that recurred in the workers' responses, and re-coded the data with codes such as commitment, divisions or respect. As such, the analytical framework was developed abductively, through an interplay between deductive and inductive approaches (Thagaard 2009 ).
The Sino-Mozambican workplace regimes
What can we make of the workplace regimes under study? What happens to Chinese company practice in a Mozambican context, and what do Chinese companies bring to the workplaces that give rise to contestation and tension? A workplace regime is created through a web of policies and practices: place-specific characteristics influence how the labour strategies of companies are 'shaped by the role of the state in reproduction of labour, the relation between external and internal labour markets, dynamics of local political movements, and structure of household division of labour' (Peck 1996, 138 Mozambican government officials, they emphasize the number of workers employed rather than the quality of their working conditions. As a result, Chinese companies seem to be able to develop workplace regimes as they see fit.
The data suggests there are large similarities in workplace regimes across the three construction projects in this study. Thus, one may speak of one workplace regime for the Mozambican workers, although this analysis draws on data from three different workplaces.
The following sections are organised along Nichols et al.'s (2004) categorisation of labour control issues, material support issues, and contract issues. The analysis shows that the SinoMozambican workplaces are characterised by strong divisions, both spatially and metaphorically. This signifies the existence of two workplace regimes in one workplace, one regime for the Chinese, and another for the Mozambicans.
Labour control issues
There are various ways for companies to exercise control over labour. The literature on workplace regimes in China highlights the use of dormitories for spatial control, where the employer can control the whereabouts of the workers at all times. The dormitory workplace regime is often thought of as a distinct Chinese labour practice (Pun and Smith 2007; Pun and Yu 2008) , found in many different types of production. Construction is no exception, and construction workers typically live in dormitories in construction projects in China (Tang 2014 ). In construction projects in Maputo, however, the dormitories are given a very different meaning. They are reserved for the Chinese workers, who live in a foreign place, do not understand the language, or have time to familiarise themselves with the local community.
Chinese project managers explain that the dormitory practice for Chinese workers in The Mozambican workers express great discontent about the functional flexibility strategies initiated by the Chinese construction companies. Functional flexibility refers to workers performing multiple tasks, allowing management 'to move workers around jobs and tasks as the need calls' (Dyer 1998, 228) . According to Mozambican law, all workers should have contracts which specify their positon (ACIC 2011), and the workers interviewed had all been hired with a specific position. In practice, however, the company disregards these work categories and the specification of positions:
There are various sectors, but a mechanic can be sent for construction, a driver can be sent for construction, or for mechanics. The mechanic can also be sent to the pumps.
Because of this, every day when you arrive here for work, you just wait for your boss to see you and say; today you go to site x. And you have to go to that site because he is the one that signs the timesheet. (Group interview, Mozambican workers,
17.05.2013)
The Mozambican workers express both humiliation and a lack of motivation at the Chinese disregard for work categories. It deprives them of pride and reputation they have obtained through previous jobs, and they feel as if they are taking a step back instead of advancing:
We are all equal. We are all servants. (Corkin 2012) .
Material support issues
Low wages are a constant complaint amongst the Mozambican workers. The payment they receive is at or below minimum wage, and below what the workers would deem a fair wage. 
Contract issues
The percentage of Mozambican workers with contracts varies amongst the three projects.
Nearly all the workers have written contracts in the first project, a minority of the workers have contracts in the second, and in the third, none of the workers have contracts. However, the contract does not have any effect on work security, work tasks or status. Even workers with contracts know that their superior can fire them for any reason at any time, signifying that the contract is nothing more than a formality:
No one knows the day to leave, but the contract is the same, because every day when you come to work, you may find a list and see that you're no longer going to work.
[Mimics the superiors] 'You do not work, you do not come anymore, go home, go home', just because your boss does not like you. (Group interview 1, Mozambican workers, 17.05.13).
Literature on national Chinese projects reveals that construction workers in China seldom hold written contracts or have access to social security benefits. The workers often live on small allowances that should cover daily costs, while salaries are paid annually (Tang 2014 ).
Chinese workers are paid using a similar arrangement in Chinese-led projects in Mozambique.
However, the Mozambican workers' perception is that the Chinese never have to spend any money because they are taken care of by the company. The strong divisions between the two nationalities that permeate the workplace lead to the cementing of two separate workplace regimes. While Mozambican workers complain about equipment, wages and lack of job security, this case illustrates that the divided workplace, where different workers are subject to different workplace regimes, is an underlying cause of resentment and tension in the Sino-Mozambican. Although Mozambican workers may be used to poor pay and working conditions in Mozambican companies, the lack of a social relationship and the constant reminders of segregation seem to be exacerbating the workers' grievances. So why do they stay on the project?
Labour agency in a divided workplace
Labour agency is affected both by the organisation of the workplace and the wider institutional framework, and may entail both individual and collective strategies (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011) . In this context, labour agency is examined by looking at the strategies the workers use as responses to the workplace regime they take part in.
Voicing resentment
The Mozambican workers explain how they employ two voice strategies to demonstrate their resentment as a group. The first is what they refer to as strike, similar to the one mentioned in the introduction. Such strikes occur on a regular basis and normally continue for one or two days. Workers sit outside the project area refusing to work. However, they return to work before any agreement is reached, often without any negotiation, because they cannot afford to lose more than a few days' pay (Interview, Mozambican workers, 17.05.13, 16.01.14, 01.10.14). The workers think of their actions as part of an ongoing strike or struggle, even when they return to work:
We continue to work, but the strike will go on until they [the Chinese company] change a bit. What we want is that they give us money so that we are able to work every day, but also that they give us time because we have families. (Interview, Mozambican workers, 16.01.14)
A second response has been 'shutdowns' (paralisaçoes) initiated by drivers. They stop their cars for up to two hours during the day to demonstrate against the unfair company policy where workers are responsible for equipment (including cars) that is damaged during their shift. Neither of these strategies have resulted in any significant change on behalf of the company although some of the workers mentioned that they believe the day-to-day pressure from their Chinese superiors has decreased slightly. Workers' pay checks, contract, and hours have stayed the same, and the cost of broken equipment is still withdrawn from their pay check. These strategies can be deemed collective, simply because they entail a certain collective organisation. However, the strategies fail to accomplish any change in the There are companies that have been working in Mozambique for four to five years, just that we only get to know them when there are problems [...] . When already in a strike, we often find that the workers say 'you say you are the union, but where have you been during these four years when we have been here suffering every day?
[…]Please leave; we will solve this ourselves.' I mean, we are in a difficult situation.
Who contributes, however, is the government itself. (Interview, trade union, 14.06.13)
The interview excerpt above illustrates some of the challenges facing the union. Unions are dependent on cooperation from the government that they do not receive, and on recognition from the workers that they do not have. The unions, therefore, do not enable workers' agency as they lack bargaining power and sanctioning authority. This is in line with the findings of . They explain that the Mozambican labour movement was initially designed as a 'transmission belt for ruling party decisions' (258) with real power located in the workplace. Economic reforms during the 1990s broke the unions' close relation with the ruling party and weakened the unions' bargaining position.
The collective responses of the Mozambican workers can be categorised as voice strategies aimed at improving working conditions. However, workers' intentions are not achieved, illustrating the need to distinguish between the intention of workers' strategies and what they actually accomplish (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011) . In the Sino-Mozambican workplace, the lack of institutional support constrains the potential scale of workers' strategies and the potential for these strategies to result in negotiations and change. Negotiations are not brought to a level with decisive power, and the Chinese companies are not pressured into meeting the demands of the workers. The workers' collective strategies can be viewed as agency in that the workers use them to alter the workplace. However, they do not successfully achieve this goal.
Lack of commitment and the exit option
Lacking institutional support, workers may turn to individual strategies. Low job satisfaction is predicted to lead to the less fruitful responses of neglect or exit (Farrell and Rusbult 1992) .
While many workers express a wish to quit, the tough labour market conditions prevent them from pursuing this option. According to the African Development Bank (2012), 27 percent of the Mozambican population is unemployed, and an estimated 300 000 new workers enter the labour market annually. Furthermore, the formal sector accounts for only 32 percent of all employment in the country. As expressed by one of the workers:
[…] here in Mozambique, to find work is a serious problem, if you find one, you have to work. To get work in Mozambique is no joke; you have to endure the conditions.
(Group interview, Mozambican workers, 17.05.13)
Although employment generation, decent work, and formalisation of labour is a top priority for the Mozambican government in national development strategy papers (e.g., PRP 2011 , IMF 2011 , the government has so far failed to establish appropriate support mechanisms to fulfil these goals. While workers have the intention to exit, the lack of alternatives inhibits their actions. The line of job-seeking young men outside the construction sites is a reminder of the constant threat of replacement. The Mozambican workers both feel themselves to be and in fact are replaceable, especially since they mainly execute low-skilled work tasks. The high level of unemployment and the large informal employment sector intensifies the situation and results in advantages for Chinese companies. A Chinese engineer formulated it simply when asked about the qualities of local labour: 'The good thing is that they are easy to find, the workers. Because many, many people do not have formal jobs'.
(Interview, 27.05.13).
According to Farrell and Rusbult (1992) Workers' lack of commitment relates to several of features of the workplace regimes outlined above. First, it is connected to the companies' use of functional flexibility, where the workers feel they have no individual value in the workplace and are only doing simple, heavy work.
Furthermore, workers' lack of commitment relates to payment. The workers do not feel appreciated, as the material support received is very low despite the fact that they work longer hours and the workload is heavier than in other local jobs. Lastly, the lack of commitment relates to lack of communication and the strict separation of Chinese and Mozambican workers, which hampers the potential for creating personal relationships between nationalities. Combined with little determination over their own job and the future, the Mozambican workers have a hard time finding any commitment to the project or the company.
The strategies pursued by Mozambican labour have not resulted in any change to the system's status quo. As long as their voice strategies are not successful, the only potential for workers to actively alter their own situation seems to be exit. This is not necessarily a problem for the Chinese companies as long as they have an abundant pool of labour from which to recruit new workers. Furthermore, individual exit is dependent on alternative jobs in the local labour market. Otherwise, the workers will stay. The local labour market provides few alternatives, meaning that although the majority of the Mozambican workers are miserable in their current situation, they are prevented from choosing exit. In sum, labour agency is constrained at three levels. First, the degree of distance between Chinese and Mozambicans in the workplace leaves little space for participation and beneficial voice strategies. Second, workers lack institutional support to respond to company violations of their rights and labour regulations. Third, workers lack alternative employment opportunities in the local labour market.
Conclusion
In 2007 Mozambicans. Moreover, the workers lack institutional support to respond to company violations of their rights and regulations. The workers' collective strategies illustrate the difficulties in accomplishing their objectives when negotiations lack institutional support that could provide political scale. In addition, the workers are prevented from exiting because of the lack of alternative employment opportunities in the local labour market.
While labour is in theory protected and regulated through the Constitution and Labour Law, this does not translate into labour protection in practice. This study illustrates the challenges of a development strategy that relies on foreign capital but lacks the institutional capacity to monitor and control whether foreign activities are in line with national law and regulations.
Economic concerns continue to dominate Mozambican industrial policy, and as noted by Levy (2003, 4) , 'the gap between the theory as announced in the law and practice in the labor market is very great.'
